Does Landslide Victory in Hungary Mean Landslide Changes in Hungarian Foreign Policy?

In a CED exclusive, Mátyás Eörsi, Hungarian Member of Parliament from 1990-2010 and former Chairman of the EU Affairs Committee, examines the confluence of internal and international priorities under the new Fidesz government.
The biggest electoral landslide victory in recent European history just took place in Hungary. As a result, Fidesz is today the strongest Christian-Democratic Party in Europe, enjoying the highest – two-thirds – constitutional majority in parliament. A troubling aspect of the April elections is the entry into parliament of the nationalist, neo-Nazi, radical right Jobbik party, making it the strongest European extremist party with 17 percent public support.

What will the new government do? What will its foreign policy be? Several indicators may provide clues: What were Fidesz priorities when it was previously in government? What did it learn, if anything, from its mistakes? What were its policies while in the opposition and during the recent campaign? And finally, what are the political realities?

It is worth recalling that Viktor Orbán, when he was Prime Minister of Hungary from 1998-2002, started with an excellent image in the West. He signed the accession treaty with NATO and his government labored on Hungary’s accession to the EU. The foreign policy of Hungary during this period was overshadowed, however, by two phenomena. First, Mr. Orbán’s government was perceived as nationalistic, not averse to getting into a conflict, for both legitimate and bogus interests of ethnic Hungarians, with neighboring states. Under Orbán’s leadership, for example, the Hungarian parliament adopted the Status Law, which provided special legal status, albeit no citizenship, to ethnic Hungarians in surrounding countries. The Status Law damaged Hungary’s relations with some of its neighbors, especially with Romania, which claimed that the law had an extraterritorial effect.

Second, Hungary’s relationship with the U.S. deteriorated when Mr. Orbán was reluctant to distance himself from the Hungarian ultra-nationalist MIÉP party leader, István Csurka, who in the Parliament argued that September 11 was a deserved punishment for America. After this affair, despite all his efforts, Orbán was no longer welcome in Washington. Having understood the consequences, Mr. Orbán clearly – and rightly – did everything possible to improve his standing with Washington.

Paradoxically, former Socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány unwittingly contributed to the restoration of Orbán’s image. Hungary’s allies were initially comforted by the Socialists’ victory in 2002, but then questioned the government’s cooperation with Russia, particularly its opposition to the Nabucco project at its infancy. Mr. Orbán’s vocal criticism of what he claimed to be the excessively pro-Russian attitude of Gyurcsány’s government and the worsening image of the Socialist government helped his rehabilitation.

While his former unfavorable reputation in Washington must have been a bitter experience for Mr. Orbán, it is still unclear what lessons he learned and to what extent is he ready to change.

Obviously, foreign policy will not and cannot be independent either from his domestic policies or from his political views. For Mr. Orbán – like any democratically elected leader – domestic politics are crucial, and his foreign policy will be largely subordinate. The trap for Mr. Orbán is twofold. He will be under constant pressure from the anti-Western, nationalist, radical right Jobbik; and in fear of losing support to Jobbik, he may go too far in engaging in conflicts with neighbors. Further, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to meet the expectations he himself has created by a very populist campaign. Should Mr. Orbán encounter difficulties on the domestic front, he may seek compensation abroad. For example, the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary has already deteriorated. Mr. Orbán campaigned on easing attainment of Hungarian citizenship by ethnic Hungarian citizens of neighboring countries. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has already announced that Slovakia would introduce counter-measures, because – as he maliciously claims – the extraterritorial legislation of Hungary endangers Slovakia’s national security. Slovakia is holding elections this month, and nationalism is a familiar political refrain there as well. It is clear, however, that nationalism goes hand in hand in antagonistic countries. Nationalists fight with each other on the surface, but they provide the biggest political support to one another. Hungarian nationalists support Slovak nationalists, and vice versa. A continuous Hungarian-Slovak struggle, however, will prevent both countries from taking advantage of the cooperative structure provided by the Visegrád Group within the EU. The cost of these fights could be enormous, expressed in billions of euros. Yet the potential domestic political gain might encourage leaders of both countries to stay on the nationalistic track.

Mr. Orbán called this election a “revolution.” One can only hope that he will not apply this theory to foreign policy. Since Fidesz never criticized the former government for Hungary’s support in Afghanistan, the incoming government will most likely continue Hungary’s participation in NATO’s anti-terrorist struggle there, in spite of possible heavy Jobbik criticism and demagogy. Hungary will assume the EU presidency in 2011, providing both a challenge and an opportunity to Hungarian foreign policy. The new Foreign Minister János Martonyi is a respected moderate politician and an expert in EU affairs; he may be able to prevent Mr. Orbán from making some ill-conceived mistakes. The Summit for Heads of States and Governments of the Eastern Partners, which will be held in Budapest during the EU presidency, may enable the new Hungarian government to prove that its foreign policy is based on jointly shared values in the alliances. During the first Orbán government, Hungary was a driving force to promote the Western Balkans. The Socialist government continued this commitment, and it is certain that Orbán will remain on this track as well.

Under this just partially favorable forecast, one can conclude that there might and perhaps will be improvements in Hungary’s foreign policy – but probably only in areas where foreign policy will not put Mr. Orbán’s popularity at risk.


Mátyás Eörsi was a Member of Parliament for the liberal SZDSZ from 1990-2010. He was Parliamentary Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1997-1998, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee from 1994-1997, Chairman of the EU Affairs Committee from 2004-2010, and Leader of the ALDE Group in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from 2002-2009.

(Published on the website of CEPA (Center for European Policy Analysis) at http://www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=243, on 1 June, 2010)

2010. június 24.